The High Education Teacher, an Agent of Moral Development

The article shows the classroom like an workplace to move moral development, from the relationship between students and professors in the university atmosphere. It proposes elements to take to the practice the ethics education a transverse curriculum line. It assumes the ethics, from a plural perspective, founded on the knowledge and the human action. It joins the integral formation with the conceptions of education, curriculum, pedagogical models and methodologies of education. It proposes actions to demonstrate the commitment of the professor with the integral formation. Finally, concludes that the professor is agent of moral development and that in the classroom is constructed: identity, autonomy and responsibility, from open and plural relation between professors and students and between these and the knowledge.

Reflections About the Teaching Methodology Processes Related with the Cognition of the Superior Education Student

In concordance whit permanent global and local changes in superior education, not only in Colombia but in the world, and having in account the relevance of pedagogical actions and their incidence in the student’s cognitive level, it’s necessary analyze and to reflect about the mecanism involved in the learning processes, in order to improve the curriculums and inside of them, the teaching methodologies, pedagogy an didacts that promote better the students cognition. In the present article an analysis is made of teaching methodologies developed in Institutions of superior education with subsequent learnings that not always facilitate the cognitive development of the student, as well as a proposal of educative innovation elements aimed to guide the teachers into a careful consideration of their pedagogical practice.

Heterogeneity and the formation of risk - sharing coalitions

We offer a new explanation of partial risk sharing based on coalition formation and segmentation of society in a risky environment, without assuming limited commitment and imperfect information. Heterogenous individuals in a society freely choose with whom they will share risk. A partition belonging to the core of the membership game obtains. Perfect risk sharing does not necessarily arise. Focusing on mutual insurance rule and assuming that individuals only differ with respect to risk, we show that the core partition is homophily-based. The distribution of risk affects the number and size of these coalitions. Individuals may pay a lower risk premium in riskier societies. A higher heterogeneity in risk leads to a lower degree of risk sharing. We discuss how the endogenous partition of society into risk-sharing coalitions may shed light on empirical evidence on partial risk sharing. The case of heterogenous risk aversion leads to similar results.